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STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
Robert L. Roland*
CORPORATION FRANCHISE TAXES
The state's effort to redefine the incidence of its franchise tax to
get around the adverse decision in Colonial Pipe v. Mouton' came to
naught when the same taxpayer was able to persuade the same circuit
that the amended statute was substantially the same.' The court
found the differences in the statute after amendment "to be a distinc-
tion without a difference. "'3 The writer's chief criticism with the deci-
sion lies not in the court's conclusion concerning the amended statute
but in its failure to apply the United States Supreme Court decision
of Memphis National Gas Co. v. Stone.' The Louisiana court deter-
mined that the Mississippi statute considered in Stone taxed only
capital employed in the state and that Louisiana "imposes a tax upon
the total corporate structure." '5 This conclusion ignores the fact that
Louisiana has a most comprehensive formula designed to allocate the
capital structure between Louisiana and all other states where any
portion of the capital is employed.'
INHERITANCE TAX
One of the more interesting tax cases of the current term in-
volved the Louisiana Inheritance Tax.7 Succession of Kaufman' dealt
with the calculation of inheritance taxes due by: (1) a surviving
spouse as beneficiary of 85% of the income of a trust in which the
trustees had power to invade to the extent of the disposable portion;
(2) a forced heir as beneficiary of 15% of the income; and (3) three
grandchildren as principal beneficiaries. The court had previously
determined that the income beneficiary was taxable to the extent
that the trustees could invade the corpus and that his beneficiary
interest with reference to the community property was tantamount
* Special Lecturer in Law, Louisiana State University; Member, Baton Rouge
Bar.
1. 228 So. 2d 718 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969); see The Work of the Louisiana Appel-
late Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-State and Local Taxation, 31 LA. L. REv. 336, 337
(1971).
2. Colonial Pipe. Co. v. Agerton, 275 So. 2d 834 (La. App( 1st Cir. 1973).
3. Id. at 836.
4. 335 U.S. 80 (1948).
5. Colonial Pipe. Co. v. Agerton, 275 So. 2d 834, 837 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
6. LA. R.S. 47:606 (1950).
7. LA. R.S. 47:2401-423 (1950), as amended.
8. 274 So. 2d 471 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
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to a legal usufruct and not taxable.9 Under the terms of the trust, the
court found that the surviving spouse owed tax on three things: (1)
the naked ownership of the disposable two-thirds of his wife's half of
the community; (2) and 85% usufruct of his wife's separate property;
and (3) the naked ownership of the disposable two-thirds of his wife's
separate property. The court found the forced heir to have an income
interest of 15%. The right to invade the corpus for the benefit of the
forced heir after the death of the surviving spouse and the successive
rights of various income beneficiaries were found to be contingent and
not subject to tax. The court was then faced with valuing the chil-
dren's interest as principal beneficiaries. One solution might have
been to calculate the value of the usufruct by reference to the life of
the younger usufructuary but this would have then left open the
question of what additional adjustment, if any, should be made for
the right to invade. 0 However, the court simply added the taxable
inheritance and the non-taxable portion of the estate, subtracted the
result from the total value of the estate and distributed the result
equally among the three grandchildren. The tax treatment to be ac-
corded various interests under testamentary trusts would appear to
be worthy of legislative consideration.
MOTOR VEHICLE TAXES
In Saia North Freight Lines, Inc. v. Agerton," the supreme court
found that a classification of commercial vehicles for motor vehicle
licenses on a domicile-use-area basis rather than solely on a use-area
basis was not unconstitutionally arbitrary. This conclusion is not
surprising in view of the rather liberal attitude toward classification
historically exhibited by Louisiana courts. 2
SALES TAXES
Is the legislation 3 authorizing the City of Baton Rouge and the
9. Succession of Bellinger, 229 So. 2d 749, 750-51 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969); see The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-State and Local
Taxation, 31 LA. L. REv. 336, 338 (1971).
10. When faced with an analogous situation concerning the value to be attributed
to the difference in a lifetime usufruct and one terminating on marriage, an earlier
court refused to assign a value, saying, "Neither you, nor I, nor nobody [sic] knows."
Succession of Lynch, 145 So. 42, 44 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1932).
11. 275 So. 2d 393 (La. 1973).
12. See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937); Bel Oil
Corp. v. Roland, 242 La. 498, 137 So. 2d 308 (1962); State v. Arthur Duvic's Sons, 185
La. 647, 170 So. 23 (1936); Hunter v. Wells Fargo Exp. Co., 134 La. 358, 64 So. 139
(1914).
13. LA. R.S. 33:2741 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1956, No. 401 § 1; 1966, No.
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Parish of East Baton Rouge to levy sales taxes without voter approval
unconstitutionally discriminatory in light of general legislation re-
quiring voter approval? The Louisiana supreme court did not reach
this basic question in the case of Jacobs v. City of Baton Rouge"
because it found that the proceeds of the taxes in question, while not
dedicated or pledged to the payment of principal and interest on
specific bonds, were necessary to pay the principal and interest on
such bonds within the intent of R.S. 13:4452. Accordingly, it dis-
missed the appeal of the plaintiff taxpayers as having not been timely
filed.
The other three sales tax cases reported during the current term
were also disposed of on procedural points. In Hallis v. Agerton,15 the
plaintiff objected to the refusal of the Louisiana Collector of Revenue
to refund that portion of the state sales tax paid as the result of
including the federal excise tax on new automobiles (subsequently
discontinued and refunded) in the sales price upon which the Louis-
iana sales tax was based. Feeling that if the federal government re-
quired dealers to refund to purchasers the 7% excise tax paid on
vehicles purchased between August 16, 1971 (the effective date of the
discontinuance), and December 10, 1971 (the date of passage of the
legislation), Louisiana should refund the 3% sales tax attributable
thereto, Mr. Hallis filed a mandamus action individually, and as a
class representative. The Collector filed exceptions of unauthorized
use of summary procedure, improper use of class action, and no cause
or right of action. Although all of the exceptions appear to the writer
to have been well founded, both the trial court and the appellate
court concluded that no ministerial duty was involved and hence
mandamus was inapplicable. The court's specific refusal to consider
the other arguments advanced by the Collector 6 will possibly encour-
age some future litigant to question those arguments.
The First Circuit, in the companion cases of Ortlieb Press, Inc.
v. Mouton 7 and Musso v. Collector of Revenue" recognized the exist-
ence of Collector v. Pioneer Bank 9 and R.S. 47:158120 but declined
398 § 1; 1970, No. 559 § 1.
14. 262 La. 342, 263 So. 2d 315 (1972).
15. 273 So. 2d 887 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
16. "Having disposed of this matter for the above reasons, it is unnecessary to
consider the other arguments made by defendant. Id. at 889.
17. 268 So. 2d 85 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
18. 268 So. 2d 90 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
19. 250 La. 446, 196 So. 2d 270 (1967).
20. "Any tax, penalty, interest, or other charges duly assessed under this Subtitle,
being the equivalent of a judgment, shall not be subject to the running of any prescrip-
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to give effect to either. The court construed R.S. 47:1561 to mean that
the remedy of paying under protest is available to a taxpayer at any
time prior to his filing of a petition with the Board of Tax Appeals
for a redetermination of an assessment or prior to being sued by the
Collector. In the opinion of the writer, the carefully documented dis-
sent of Judge Tucker in Musso more clearly expressed the current
state of Louisiana law on the subject. The Louisiana legislature effec-
tively dealt with the point at issue in these cases by amending R.S.
47:1561 to add as a third restriction to the taxpayer's right to pay
under protest instances when an assessment has become final.2 '
Whether the majority opinions represent a breach in the "assessment
equals judgment" wall built by the Revenue Department over the
years remains to be seen.2
SEVERANCE TAXES
Does the City of Lake Charles owe the State of Louisiana sever-
ance tax on sand dredged from the bottom of one portion of Lake
Charles and used as fill material in another portion of Lake Charles?
Agerton v. City of Lake Charles3 saw the Fourth Circuit concluding
not, in a rather unique construction of the constitutional provisions
authorizing the reclamation and development of a portion of the bed
of Lake Charles adjacent to the downtown section of the City of Lake
Charles. Neither of the applicable constitutional provisions '- contain
any reference to a waiver or an exemption from the severance tax, but
the court found that
[iut would be inconsistent with the intent and purpose of these
constitutional provisions to hold that the city is liable for a sever-
ance tax on this sand which it was authorized to dredge from one
place to another in the lake bed."6
The court was undoubtedly impressed by the fact that the City of
Lake Charles, prior to beginning the development in question, re-
tion other than such prescription as would run against a judgment in favor of the State
of Louisiana in accordance with the Constitution and laws of this state; and the
recordation of such assessment shall have the same effect as the recordation of a
judgment."
21. LA. R.S. 47:1561 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 566 § 1.
22. Collector v. Pioneer Bank, 250 La. 446, 196 So. 2d 270 (1967); LA. R.S. 47:1581
(1950); LA. R.S. 47:1578(4) (1950).
23. 273 So. 2d 353 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
24. LA. CONST, art. XIV, §§ 39(a), (d).
25. Id.
26. 273 So. 2d at 356.
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ceived negative replies from the Collector of Revenue and the Depart-
ment of Wildlife and Fisheries to its inquiries concerning its liability
for severance taxes and royalties, and pursuant to these replies de-
leted any request for federal funds to pay severance taxes.
The court went on to cite the doctrine of "contemporaneous con-
struction" to support its conclusion, but ignored the requirement that
such construction must have been acted upon for a number of years
and that the doctrine is not applicable unless the statute is ambigu-
ous2 Similarly, while citing the rule of statutory construction that
tax laws are interpreted liberally in favor of the taxpayer, the court
ignored the fact that there was nothing in the severance tax law under
consideration which would give the city the relief it sought and that
an equally familiar rule of statutory construction is that exemptions
from taxation are to be strictly construed against one claiming the
exemption.29 A more reasonable construction might have been one
which concluded, as did the ruling of the Collector, that under the
facts of the case, there was no severance within the meaning of the
statute. Failing this, it seems more appropriate to require the legisla-
ture to relieve any inconvenience or hardship that resulted from fol-
lowing the statute as written rather than have the court substitute
construction for legislation.
The other severance tax case"9 decided during the current term
involved the interpretation of the phrase "in the field where pro-
duced." Humble Oil produced gas in five fields, a portion of which,
after comingling, was returned to each field for fuel and gas lift pur-
poses. Under the pertinent provision of the severance tax statute, 0
the severance tax does not accrue on gas used for such purposes in
the field where produced. The court did not use any artificial rule of
statutory construction in declining to adopt the literal application of
the phrase sought by the Collector but instead concluded that
construing the phrase to include returned gas, identifiable as a mea-
sured quantity which did not exceed the total field production during
the taxable period, achieved the objects and purposes of the statute
and hence the gas in question was not subject to the tax.
27. See, e.g., State v. U-Drive It Car Co., 79 So. 2d 590 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1955)
(and cases therein cited).
28. See, e.g., Mattingly v. Vail, 193 La. 1, 9, 190 So. 313, 315 (1939).
29. Humble Oil and Ref. Co. v. Traigle, 271 So. 2d 677 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
30. LA. R.S. 47:633(9)(d) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1956, No. 102 § 1; 1958,
Ex. Sess., No. 2 § 2; 1960, No. 9 § 1; 1964, No. 33 § 1; 1970, No. 323 § 1; 1972, No.
211 § 1; 1972, Ex. Sess., No. 2 § 1.
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TAX SALES
Three cases involved the application of the five year peremption
period of Article X, § 11 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921. In
Welsch v. Carmadelle,3' the court held that the five year period ap-
plied, despite lack of notice to the debtor and despite a minor irregu-
larity in the description. The decision is in accord with prior juris-
prudence.
In Piper v. Bach,32 the same court found the sale by the state to
the plaintiff to be an absolute nullity unprotected by the five year
peremptive period because the property was in the public domain in
the year for which the adjudication occurred. The First Circuit in
Mayo v. Stoessell,33 refused to add as a fourth exception to peremp-
tion, a tax sale of property for less than the taxes due or advertised
thereon. In so doing, the court had to choose between the public
policy expressed in R.S. 47:218611 and that expressed in Article X,
§ 11. The court wisely opted for the latter.
A tax sale of property does not cancel a pre-existing vendor's lien.
This principle, which finds ample statutory and jurisprudential sup-
port, was reaffirmed by the First Circuit in Whitfield v. Jones,35
which also considered two peripheral questions involving the use of
executory process. One of defendant's ancestors in title had instituted
foreclosure proceedings by executory process against the delinquent
taxpayer to enforce his lien and special mortgage after the tax sale
and monition proceeding. The court found that the tax sale purchaser
need not be made a party to the proceedings under the express provi-
sions of Code of Civil Procedure article 2701 and that Code of Civil
Procedure article 2642 requires all defenses and procedural objections
to an executory proceeding to be asserted by injunction or suspensive
appeal. The court declined to consider the contention that the lack
of notification of the executory proceedings to the tax purchaser-
owner of record violated the due process requirements of the state and
federal constitutions on the ground that the constitutional issues had
not been pleaded or raised below.
31. 264 So. 2d 341 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
32. 269 So. 2d 619 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
33. 277 So. 2d 520 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
34. This section requires that bids accepted in tax sales be at least equal to the
taxes, costs and interests.
35. 270 So. 2d 153 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
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